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A B ST R AC T. In June 2010, after more than a decade of negotiation, the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) agreed on a definition of
the crime of aggression. But the Assembly failed to address a critical issue: whether and how
prosecutions for aggression fit within the ICC's complementarity regime. That regime positions
the ICC as a court of last resort; domestic prosecutions are preferred except in a very narrow set
of circumstances. Thus, an aggressed state could conceivably prosecute, in its own courts, the
nationals of an aggressor state. This Note argues that the crime of aggression is a poor fit with
the general complementarity regime, creating major tensions. Policymakers have so far
overlooked the problem, despite its potential implications for international peace and security, as
well as the ICC's legitimacy. On the one hand, domestic prosecutions of the crime of aggression
pose serious risks to international political stability. At the same time, bringing aggression
prosecutions only at the ICC would create its own difficulties, such as incomplete concurrence
between proceedings at the domestic level and proceedings at the ICC. Because the aggression
amendments to the Rome Statute will take effect in 2017, policymakers must address the
complementarity question, and soon. After diagnosing the dilemma, this Note offers several
recommendations for a way forward.
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RECONCILING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND COMPLEMENTARITY
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP)' to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) finally agreed on a definition for the crime
of aggression after years of deliberations.' The ASP adopted the Rome Statute,
the treaty creating the ICC, in 1998, but the crime of aggression proved too
contentious. The ASP failed to reach a consensus on its definition or
jurisdictional regime. Rather than allow that division to derail the entire treaty,
the ASP punted on the issue of aggression by writing a promise into the Rome
Statute that it would eventually return to it.' Until that time, the ICC could
exercise jurisdiction only over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide.' More than a decade passed before the ASP, meeting in Kampala,
Uganda, fulfilled its promise and amended the Rome Statute to define the
crime of aggression and the conditions for the ICC's jurisdiction over it.
The Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute defined the crime of
aggression as "the planning, preparation, initiation or execution" by a high-
level official "of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations."s When
committed by the armed forces of one state against another state, examples of
acts that would qualify as "aggression" include invasion or attack,
bombardment, blockade of ports or coasts, and sending mercenaries to carry
out acts of armed force.6 The ASP also agreed to jurisdictional rules governing
the crime and adopted a set of Understandings' touching on Security Council
1. The ASP is a legislative body composed of representatives of the states that have ratified and
acceded to the Rome Statute. It is responsible for managing and overseeing the ICC.
Assembly of States Parties, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en menus/asp/assembly
/Pages/assembly.aspx [http://perma.cc/A7JX-V3ZN].
2. Assembly of States Parties Res. RC/Res.6, annex III (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter
Kampala Amendments], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6
-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/98GE-75NN].
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute] ("The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.").
4. Id. art. 5(l)-
5. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex 1.2.
6. Id.
7. For a discussion of the legal status of the seven Understandings adopted at Kampala, see
generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Uncertain Legal Status of the Aggression Understandings, io J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 229 (2012).
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referrals, temporal jurisdiction, domestic jurisdiction, and the nature of an
aggression determination.8
There were many difficult issues on the table in Kampala, as one might
expect from a gathering that followed more than twelve years of debate. Yet the
ASP devoted scant attention to a critically important issue: whether and how
aggression fits within the ICC's complementarity regime. Complementarity
positions the ICC as a court of last resort. Domestic prosecutions are strongly
preferred over ICC prosecutions in all but a very narrow set of circumstances.
The crime of aggression could give rise to three types of domestic
prosecutions. First, a state could prosecute its own nationals, such as the
principals of a former regime. This type of prosecution is unlikely to provoke
the concerns that animate this Note. Second, a state with no real connection to
an act of aggression could prosecute under extraordinary bases of jurisdiction,
such as universal jurisdiction. This type of prosecution has the potential to
cause acute political problems, but is unlikely to occur given evidentiary and
procedural barriers. Finally, an aggressed state could prosecute the nationals of
an aggressor state. This last type of prosecution -in which one state accuses
another state of aggression-will likely prompt the most international debate
and warrants concern. Such prosecutions could destabilize conflict
management and resolution efforts, deter states from undertaking certain
military forms of humanitarian intervention, and even undermine the ICC's
legitimacy and stability.'
At the same time, deviating from the standard complementarity framework
for the crime of aggression by discouraging domestic prosecutions would
create its own set of problems, such as incomplete concurrence between
domestic and ICC proceedings. Moreover, the victim state's ability to prosecute
the nationals of an aggressor state may be critical to deterring aggression.
Relying primarily or solely on the ICC to prosecute aggression would likely
result in fewer prosecutions than would take place if states could also
prosecute. By extension, the deterrent power created by the crime's inclusion in
8. See Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex III.
9. See Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States
Perspective, 1o9 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 277 (2015) ("Imagine two states at war, each making
accusations of aggression against the other: it is all too predictable how an aggression case
would come out. The leader of one state would likely be held criminally liable in the
domestic courts of the other. But would the interests of the international community in
either peace or justice be promoted by establishing a norm that promotes such cases or
domestic prosecutions in third states?"); Sarah Sewall, Under Sec'y for Civilian Sec.,
Democracy, & Human Rights, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing
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the Rome Statute might be weakened and the uptake of an international
antiaggression norm slowed.
In sum, the ASP faces a difficult choice laden with tradeoffs: if it situates
the crime of aggression within the ICC's longstanding complementarity
regime, it risks destabilization and threats to the ICC's legitimacy. But if the
ASP rejects complementarity for the crime of aggression and limits or bans
domestic prosecutions in favor of ICC prosecutions, it might spark complicated
procedural issues and weaken the crime's deterrent effect and normative
power.
The other Rome Statute crimes -genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity-do not pose similar challenges vis-i-vis complementarity.
Individuals may be held liable for these atrocity crimes without formally
implicating the state. In contrast, the crime of aggression inextricably
intertwines individual liability with state action.'o First, by definition, only
high-level leaders can commit aggression." Second, the crime necessarily
involves at least two states. Finally, liability for aggression hinges on a finding
that a state committed an act of aggression. These conditions dramatically raise
the political stakes of a domestic prosecution for aggression, but need not be
present for atrocity prosecutions.
lo. See Edoardo Greppi, State Responsibility for Acts of Aggression Under the United Nations
Charter: A Review of Cases, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM
THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 499, 499 (Roberto Bellelli ed., 2010) ("[T]here cannot
be individual responsibility for the crime of aggression unless the state concerned has
international responsibility for aggression."); Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Domestic Prosecution of
the Crime of Aggression After the International Criminal Court Review Conference: Possibilities
and Alternatives, 14 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2013) (noting that the crime of aggression requires
"an act of aggression, which was historically inextricably linked to acts of state").
ii. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex I (limiting crimes of aggression to conduct by
"person[s] in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State"); see also Greppi, supra note lo, at 499 ("[T]he crime of aggression
is a leadership crime, the result of acts committed by state officials, in particular by those
who are in a position of high political and/or military responsibility, putting them in a
position of authority in the decision-making process.").
12. See Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal
Court's Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of "Overzealous" National Court
Prosecutions, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 587 (2012). Though it is possible that charges of
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity could implicate conduct between two or
more states, the majority of the ICC's cases to date have involved "crimes committed by
someone within one country against nationals of that country." Id. at 588-
13. Genocide is defined as one or more of several enumerated acts -including killing, causing
serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting life conditions calculated to bring
about a group's destruction- "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 6. A crime
against humanity is defined as one or more of several enumerated acts "when committed as
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The unique tension between aggression and complementarity demands the
international community's attention. In 2004, the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression' advised the ASP that the question of fit between
aggression and complementarity "merited being revisited" once the ASP agreed
on a definition of aggression and the conditions for the ICC's exercise of
jurisdiction.15 The ASP, however, has failed to heed this call. Even after the
Kampala Review Conference, the important and complex issues surrounding
complementarity and the crime of aggression have remained undertheorized
and underdiscussed.
The Kampala Amendments are scheduled to come into force in 2017.16 The
tensions between the crime of aggression and complementarity are therefore
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." Id. art. 7. War crimes are, inter alia, "[g]rave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949" and "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law." Id. art. 8.
14. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was created by the ASP at its first
meeting. Roger S. Clark, The Crime of Aggression, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 709, 710 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
For its reports and related materials, see History of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/crime%200f
%2oaggression/Pages/History-CoA.aspx [https://perma.cc/2L6M-QANE].
15. 2004 Princeton Report, reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PR PARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION 429, 434 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kreg eds., 2012).
16. Article i bis and Article 15 ter provide that the ICC shall only exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression once at least thirty States Parties have ratified or accepted the
amendments and that same majority of States Parties agree to activate the ICC's jurisdiction
after January 1, 2017. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annexes 1.3 & 1.4. To date,
twenty-four States Parties have ratified the amendments (Andorra, Austria, Belgium,
Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay). United Nations Treaty Collection,
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 1 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume
%2oll/Chapter%2oXVIII/XVIII-io-b.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2QK-NJTA]. Thirty-three
additional countries are reported to be actively working on ratification (Albania, Argentina,
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lesotho, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, and Venezuela), and eight
are in the early stages of doing so (Ghana, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Mexico,
Moldova, Republic of Korea, and Tunisia). See Status of Ratification and Implementation,
GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON CRIME
AGGRESSION (June 26, 2015), http://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of
-ratification-and-implementation [http://perma.cc/4NXM-GRFK]. For the purposes of this
Note, I assume that thirty states will ratify by 2017.
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not front of mind for government lawyers and policymakers. But the States
Parties should not delay. Without more sustained attention to the crime of
aggression's fit with complementarity, we risk deeply concerning prosecutions
by domestic courts and bewildering procedural questions at the ICC. These
prosecutions could significantly affect international peace and security, the
prevention of mass atrocities, conflict resolution, and the legitimacy of the ICC.
The future of the United States' relationship with the ICC is also at stake. The
relationship is sufficiently fragile that even one badly managed aggression
prosecution could undo the slow and steady improvements to the ICC-U.S.
relationship made under the Obama Administration. 17 The tensions between
complementarity and aggression are not easily reconciled and require attention
now.
This Note's objectives are twofold. First, it aims to assist U.S. policymakers
by articulating a sensible system of complementarity vis-4-vis the crime of
aggression. Second, it seeks to spark dialogue on this relatively
unacknowledged problem before 2017.
The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes the history and values
underpinning complementarity to frame the subsequent analysis of how
complementarity should apply to the crime of aggression. Part II draws on the
official records on the adoption of the crime of aggression-the travaux
priparatoires-to illustrate how the International Law Commission (ILC), the
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, and delegations at
Kampala paid little attention to the complementarity issue.
Part III discusses the stakes involved. It argues that the States Parties face a
genuine and acute dilemma in navigating complementarity's application to the
crime of aggression. If the States Parties do domestically incorporate and
prosecute for aggression, they could jeopardize international political stability.
But if the States Parties do not domestically incorporate the crime of aggression,
they will be unable to prosecute for aggression, and the ICC may have to
navigate incomplete concurrence between proceedings in domestic courts and
proceedings at the ICC.
Part IV offers a way forward. It proposes four possible interventions and
assesses their political viability and potential impact. The States Parties should
(1) establish exclusive ICC jurisdiction or primacy over the crime of
aggression; (2) urge the ICC's Chief Prosecutor to issue an official statement
discouraging domestic incorporation; (3) encourage domestic prosecutions for
ordinary crimes instead of aggression; and (4) generate a multifactor list to
guide domestic prosecutions to avoid the most problematic prosecutions and
mitigate the associated harms. I recommend that a coalition of States Parties
17. See Koh & Buchwald, supra note 9, at 261-62.
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debate these four interventions at an intersessional meeting, similar to the
meetings held during the Princeton Process.
Before turning to Part I, however, I want to make clear that this Note does
not argue that the ICC and the international community would be better off
without the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute, nor do I suggest that
aggression prosecutions should be avoided. Aggression is a serious crime with
significant harms. We should endeavor to deter it and to punish those who
perpetrate it. But we must do so with thoughtful attention to the technical
details. Failing to do so could destabilize the ICC, undermine promising
diplomatic negotiations aimed at deescalating or ending future conflicts, or
otherwise jeopardize the pursuit of international peace, justice, and political
stability. This Note seeks to shine a light on the tough practicalities inherent in
efforts to end impunity for international crimes; it does not promote
abandoning the fight altogether.
1. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF COMPLEMENTARITY
Although the term "complementarity" does not appear in the Rome
Statute, it is routinely used to describe the relationship between the ICC and
domestic courts. 9 That relationship cements a preference for domestic
prosecutions, and positions the ICC as a court of last resort.
The concept of complementarity finds expression in the Rome Statute's
Preamble and Article 1. The Preamble states that "the International Criminal
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions."2 o Article i provides, "[The ICC] . . . shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."' In turn, Article 17 sets out
18. The phrase "Princeton Process" refers to a series of informal meetings hosted by the
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, as well as the formal
meetings of the Special Working Group, held between 2003 and 2009. For all of the reports
and materials pertaining to these negotiations, see THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, 2003-2009 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2oo9).
Because the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and has a unique stake in
these issues, it is not best positioned to convene this gathering. Instead, the United States
should lead from behind, reach out to other concerned states, and encourage them to serve
as conveners.
19. Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court:
International Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 MAx
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 591, 592 (2003).
20. Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
21. Id. art. 1.
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the mechanics of complementarity, providing that a case is presumptively
inadmissible before the ICC if it "is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution."' The complementarity
framework does not allow for double jeopardy: a person tried by another court
for conduct proscribed by the Rome Statute may not also be tried by the ICC
for the same conduct.
The idea of complementarity arose early on during the preparatory
negotiation phase for the ICC," but was not based on past practice." Instead,
the framework emerged from States Parties' desire to balance two interests: (i)
respecting state sovereignty and, in particular, states' rights and duties to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over international crimes; and (2) ensuring that
serious international crimes do not go unpunished.6
Practical considerations also counseled in favor of positioning the ICC as a
court of last resort. First, the ICC has limited resources and cannot feasibly
prosecute all instances of serious international crimes. 7 National authorities,
22. Id. art. I7.
23. Article 20 of the Rome Statute reads as follows:
i. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court
with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person
has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for
which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed
under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Id. art. 20.
24. Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Complementarity" as a Catalyst for
Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation, 5 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 149 (1999).
25. Interview with Molly Warlow, Dir. of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, in D.C. (Apr. ii,
2014).
26. See Benzing, supra note 19, at 595-97; John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 73-74 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999).
27. See Benzing, supra note 19, at 599-600. Of course, complkmentarity also assumes that
national jurisdictions have sufficient resources, though this is not always the case. This often
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by virtue of their proximity to the scene of the crime, are often better equipped
to interview witnesses, collect evidence, and prepare strong cases.8 Second,
complementarity comports with the customary international-law principle
favoring the exhaustion of "available and effective domestic remedies" before
international organs may exercise jurisdiction.'
The decision to adopt a complementarity framework for the ICC was
uncontroversial. The debate over complementarity during the Rome
negotiations focused "not on its merits or appropriateness, but on perfecting
the most agreeable textual approach that would gain state consensus."30
overlooked issue is a current area of focus for the ASP. See Assembly of States Parties Res.
ICC-ASP/1o/Res.5, para. 58 (Dec. 21, 2oi), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/ASPio
/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-lo-Res.5-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/GQ4G-XTVW] (resolving "to
enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to prosecute the perpetrators of the most
serious crimes of international concern in accordance with internationally-recognized fair
trial standards, pursuant to the principle of complementarity").
28. See Fatou Bensouda, Challenges Related to Investigation and Prosecution at the International
Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME
STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW, supra note io, at 131, 134.
2g. JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 226 (2008) (quoting
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5o, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217;
American Convention on Human Rights art. 46(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 41(1)(c), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; and European Convention on Human Rights art. 26, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222).
There are five recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of local remedies rule. These
exceptions were articulated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its 1988
judgment in Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras: (i) where "the domestic legislation of the state
concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that
have allegedly been violated"; (2) where "the party alleging violation of his rights has been
denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting
them"; (3) where "there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under
the aforementioned remedies"; (4) where the proposed remedy is inadequate to address the
alleged violation; or (s) where the remedy is ineffective and thus not "capable of producing
the result for which it was designed." Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (set. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 58-66 (July 29, 1988).
These exceptions are similar to, though perhaps more limited than, the Rome Statute's
"unwilling or unable" test. Both complementarity and the exhaustion of local remedies
assume that an international court is competent to assess the domestic jurisdiction's
prosecutorial capacity and readiness. Both allocate the primary responsibility for delivering
justice to states. Finally, both principles seek to balance the preservation of state sovereignty
with the protection of human rights. STIGEN, supra, at 226-28.
3o. Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 20,47 (2001).
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Commentators have since lauded complementarity as a critically important
feature of the ICC's design and acceptance."
Under the complementarity framework, the ICC plays two roles: passive
and proactive. The first assumes that complementarity serves a gatekeeping
function such that the ICC acts only where states are unable or unwilling to do
so. The second suggests that the ICC can play an active role in inspiring and
encouraging states to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes."
For instance, many commentators believe that complementarity strongly
incentivizes states to incorporate the substantive provisions of the atrocity
crimes into their domestic penal codes to ensure the ability to exercise
jurisdiction." Indeed, since the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, national
laws establishing universal jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes have
proliferated.'
In contrast to the atrocity crimes, far fewer countries have incorporated the
crime of aggression. Prior to the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, the vast
majority of states did not include the crime of aggression in their domestic
penal codes, and most domestic courts lacked jurisdiction over the crime under
any basis.s A 2009 survey of ninety national criminal codes revealed that only
31. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court-Its Relationship to Domestic
Jurisdictions, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra
note 14, at 31, 33 (calling complementarity "the decisive basis for the entire ICC system").
32. Christopher Keith Hall, Developing and Implementing an Effective Positive Complementarity
Prosecution Strategy, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 14, at 219, 219-20.
33. See Roberto Bellelli, The Establishment of the System of International Criminal Justice, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS
REVIEW, supra note 1o, at 5, 58; Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Evaluating Domestic Legislation on
the Customary Crime ofAggression Under the Rome Statute's Complementarity Regime, in THE
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 14, at 725, 732-33.
34. See Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime ofAggression, 53 HARv. INT'L L.J.
358, 364 (2012). At least 142 countries have included war crimes under their domestic law
and at least 136 countries have provided for universal jurisdiction. At least ninety-two
countries have included at least one crime against humanity under their domestic law and at
least eighty countries have provided for universal jurisdiction. At least 118 countries have
included genocide under their domestic law and at least ninety-four countries have provided
for universal jurisdiction. Amnesty Int'l, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of
Legislation Around the World-2o12 Update, Index: IOR 53/019/2012 12-13 (2012),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24ooo/ior3o192o12en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7BNX-MFU3]. Although the ICC's complementarity regime may also inspire more
states to incorporate the crime of aggression into their domestic penal codes, this has
concomitant risks, as discussed infra Part III, some of which could be mitigated by the
proposals put forth infra Part IV.
3. Beth Van Schaack, Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of
Aggression, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 133, 141-44 (2012).
741
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
twenty-four countries, mostly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, had statutes
containing some provisions relating to the crime of aggression.g6 These statutes
were largely "rudimentary,"3 7 "broadly worded, and lack[ing] precision as to
the elements of the crime." 3
If a state does not incorporate the crime of aggression into its domestic
penal code, it cannot prosecute for aggression, unless it is one of the very few
states allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime.3 9 Except for the
period immediately following World War II, when the Allies held a handful of
trials for acts of aggression,4o there have been virtually no domestic criminal
prosecutions for the crime of aggression or crimes against the peace. Under
the proactive theory of complementarity, the ICC's complementarity regime
may inspire more states over time to incorporate the crime of aggression into
their domestic penal codes.
This Note is concerned with the challenges that could emerge if many
states do in fact domestically incorporate the crime of aggression. Before
discussing those challenges, however, it first traces the minimal attention
devoted to aggression's fit with complementarity during the negotiations
leading up to the 201o Kampala Review Conference and at Kampala itself.
36. Coracini, supra note 33, at 734 & n.57. These countries were Armenia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Id.
37. Id. at 752.
38. Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the International
Criminal Court, 13 INT'L CIUM. L. REv. 829, 834 (2013). Section 8o of the German Criminal
Code, for example, provided that anyone who "prepares a war of aggression ... in which
the Federal Republic of Germany is supposed to participate and thereby creates a danger of
war for the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or
for not less than ten years." Id. at 834 n.21.
39. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 142 & n.42, 143 & nn.43-44.
4o. These trials were held pursuant to Control Council Law No. to. Issued by the Allied Control
Council on December 20, 1945, Control Council Law No. io permitted the occupying
authorities, within their Zones of Occupation, to try persons suspected of committing
crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Control Council Law No. io
(Dec. 20, 1945), reprinted in 1 TIUALs OF WAR CIUMINALs BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MIuTARY
TIUBuNALs, at xvi (photo. reprint 1998) (1949).
41. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 137-38.
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II. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: THE LEAD
UP TO KAMPALA
The negotiations that preceded the 201o Kampala Review Conference
reveal a persistent trend: States Parties have repeatedly recognized the potential
tension between the crime of aggression and complementarity, but have failed
to meaningfully engage with that tension and forge a workable resolution.
States Parties did not deviate from this trend during the Review Conference.
Most delegations paid little attention to the thorny issues inherent in applying
a complementarity framework to the crime of aggression.
According to Beth Van Schaack, a public member of the U.S. interagency
delegation to the 20o Kampala Review Conference, issue inundation and
apathy explain the dearth of discussion about complementarity. First, the
States Parties needed to resolve many open questions going into Kampala.
States were still dissatisfied with the crime's definition and significant
jurisdictional issues demanded attention.' Delegates also had to devote
attention to a stocktaking exercise wholly separate from the crime of
aggression.' Many delegations therefore felt unable to add the
complementarity problem to their plate. Second, some delegations were simply
uninterested in delving into the logistics of how an aggression prosecution
would work in practice. To them, including the crime of aggression in the
Rome Statute was an important step in realizing the legacy of Nuremberg.
They therefore focused their attention on the crime's symbolic value, not
ground-level implementation.
Delegations' inadequate time and insufficient interest in the mechanics help
explain why they failed to explore tough questions surrounding
complementarity at Kampala. This Part details this failure and its origins. It
first outlines the pre-Kampala negotiations and describes the Kampala Review
Conference itself. It highlights how the States Parties at Kampala adopted
Understanding 5, which subtly discourages domestic incorporation of the
crime of aggression. The Note then offers a current snapshot of trends in
domestic incorporation of the crime of aggression. These trends provide the
42. Telephone Interview with Beth Van Schaack, Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues, Office ofGlob. Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 23, 2014).
43 Id. This exercise focused on the Rome Statute's impact to date and involved discussions of
victims and affected communities, complementarity (unrelated to aggression), cooperation
among external actors, and the balance between the ICC's dual goals of peace and justice.
Stocktaking, CoALrrIoN FOR INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod= stocktaking
[http://perma.cc/3GSZ-2863].
44. Telephone Interview with Beth Van Schaack, supra note 42.
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necessary context for Parts III and IV, which identify present tensions and
propose ways forward.
A. Pre-Kampala Aggression Negotiations
1. Deliberations on the Draft International Law Commission Statute (1995)
Concerns about the fit between complementarity and the crime of
aggression extend back at least to 1995. That year, delegates to the newly
created United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court assembled to review and report on a draft United
Nations ILC statute.4s The draft provided that the soon-to-be-created ICC
should not prosecute aggression unless the Security Council determined that a
state had committed an act of aggression.*6 Some delegates were skeptical
about extending the ICC's jurisdiction to aggression because few domestic
penal codes encompassed the crime.' Other delegates, however, argued that
there was limited domestic legislation on aggression because no international
definition existed, and including the crime of aggression within the ICC's
jurisdiction would incentivize states to incorporate and prosecute the crime
domestically. 8 Despite acknowledging the complementarity problem, the
delegates did not meaningfully grapple with or resolve their disagreement.
2. Draft International Law Commission Code of Crimes (1996)
The issue reemerged when the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes offered the
strongest anticomplementarity position taken in the negotiations leading up to
Rome and Kampala. The draft assigned the ICC exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression and provided for a system of concurrent jurisdiction
between States Parties and the ICC over genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.49
45. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, as in THE TRAVAUX PRlPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, supra note 15, at 205.
46. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, art.
23(2) (1994), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1994.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K24Z-4UNB].
47. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 45, at 206 para. 65.
48. Id.
49. 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, with Commentary (Article 8), as in THE TRAVAUX
PRdPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 15, at 195, 195. This grant of
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The draft recommended exclusive jurisdiction for the crime of aggression
because of the crime's "unique character . .. in the sense that . .. a court cannot
determine the question of individual criminal responsibility for this crime
without considering as a preliminary matter the question of aggression by a
State."so Asking the national court of one state to sit in judgment of another
state "would be contrary to the fundamental principle of international law par
in pare[m] imperium non habet."s' This Latin phrase means that an equal has no
authority over an equal. It expresses the public international law principle that
a sovereign power is equal to and independent of another sovereign power. It is
the basis for the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity,s2 and has been
called the most "fundamental" and "universally accepted" international law
principle.s' Inviting the national court of one state to conclude whether another
state has committed aggression would violate this principle. Such violations, in
turn, "would have serious implications for international relations and
international peace and security."' Alain Pellet, an ILC member, explained, "If
... national courts could try a person for the crime of aggression without a
prior filtration process, the Court of Assize of Benghazi, say, could decide that
Luxembourg had committed an act of aggression against Mali: [a]n
inconceivable and surrealistic situation." 5
The 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes did make one exception to the
exclusive jurisdiction regime: a state could try its own nationals for the crime of
aggression. The logic behind this exception was twofold. First, prosecuting
one's own nationals does not require assessing the actions of another state and
thus does not carry the same risks to international political stability.s Second,
50. 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, with Commentary (Article 8), supra note 49, at 196.
s1. Id.
52. See Sean D. Murphy, Does International Lau Obligate States To Open Their National Courts to
Persons for the Invocation of Treaty Norms that Protect or Benefit Persons?, in THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 61, 72 (David Sloss
ed., 2009). For a brief discussion of the act of state doctrine, see 2005 Princeton Annotated
Agenda, reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PRPPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note
15, at 447.
53. Archibald King, Sitting in Judgment on the Acts ofAnother Government, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 811,
818 (1948).
54. 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, with Commentary (Article 8), supra note 49, at 196.
ss. Nicolaos Strapatsas, Complementarity and Aggression: A Ticking Time Bomb?, in FUTURE
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 450, 452 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van
den Herik eds., 2010) (quoting Summary Records of the 2384th Meeting, [1995]1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995).
56. 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, with Commentary (Article 8), supra note 49, at 196-97.
745
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
such a prosecution might actually be "essential to a process of national
reconciliation. "5
3. Initial Deliberations on the Rome Statute (1998)
The Rome Statute drafters ultimately rejected the ILC's framework.
Instead of exclusive jurisdiction for aggression and concurrent jurisdiction for
the atrocity crimes, the Rome Statute provides only for a complementarity
regime.s' Because the ASP did not immediately agree on the crime of
aggression's definition, however, the States Parties could still explore whether
and how the complementarity regime should apply to aggression.5 1
When the ASP adopted the Rome Statute in 1998, it passed a resolution to
create the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court. The Commission was charged with "prepar[ing] proposals for
practical arrangements for the establishment and coming into operation of the
Court," as well as "prepar[ing] proposals for a provision on aggression,
including the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its
jurisdiction with regard to this crime.",6 o The Commission was to present its
proposals to the ASP at a Review Conference, "with a view to arriving at an
acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in [the Rome]
Statute." 6 ,
Despite its express mandate, the Commission devoted scant attention to
complementarity during its ten sessions, spread out over roughly twenty
weeks. 6 ' The Commission did not even mention complementarity as it related
to aggression until its fourth session in March 2000. The Preparatory
Commission issued a "Preliminary List of Possible Issues Relating to the Crime
of Aggression" that included complementarity. The list asked, "How would the
provisions of the Statute on complementarity (admissibility, challenges to the
57. Id. at 197.
58. Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl. & art. 1.
59. Id. art. 5(2).
6o. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal
Court, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶¶ 5, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/lo, annex I
(July 17, 1998).
61. Id. ¶ 7.
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Court's jurisdiction) be applicable to the crime of aggression[ ? "6 It then
noted that the Rome Statute's provisions regarding international cooperation
and judicial assistance "may require further consideration depending upon the
applicability of the principle of complementarity to the crime of aggression." 6 4
The Italy delegation urged the other states to tackle the issue, questioning
whether and how complementarity would operate if national legislation
defined aggression differently from the Rome Statute."
No delegation actually addressed Italy's questions until the Sixth Session.
Certain delegations asked how complementarity would work in practice, and
whether the Security Council would play a role.66 Delegations voiced similar
concerns during the Ninth Session.6 7 Unfortunately, the discussion never
moved beyond simple acknowledgments that a problem might exist.
4. Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime ofAggression (2oo4)
The complementarity problem received a similarly cursory treatment
during the first intersessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, an arm of the ASP. The Group held its meeting at
Princeton University in June 2004 and discussed whether the Rome Statute's
provisions on complementarity should apply to the crime of aggression.
According to the meeting report, "[t]here was general agreement that no
problems seemed to arise from the current provisions [of complementarity]
being applicable to the crime of aggression," but that the issue "merited being
63. 2000 List of Issues, reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, supra note 15, at 361-62.
64. Id. at 363. The list was reprinted verbatim in Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal
Court, Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Its Pifth Session (12-30 June 2000),
UNITED NATIONS (2000), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Proceedingsj3revie%204
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8XLN-F226]; and Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court,
Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Its Ninth Session (8-9 April 2002),
UNITED NATIONS (2002), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Proceedpcnicc 2002_1hrevie
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8CFV-DYNX].
65. 2000 Proposal by Italy (oral), reprinted in THE TRAVAUX PRPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, supra note is, at 357, 359.
66. Jennifer Schense, Draft Report on the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission,
COALITION FOR INT'L CRIM. CT. 3-4 (2000), http://www.iccnow.org/documents
/6thPrepComReportCICC.pdf [http://perma.cc/WLW3-9XVZl.
67. Jennifer Schense, Draft Report on the Ninth Session of the Preparatory Commission,
COALITION FOR INT'L CRIM. CT. 11 (2002), http://www.iccnow.org/documents
/9thPrepComReportCICC.pdf [http://perma.c/G3Q 5 -7K3X] (reporting that some
delegations "questioned how the requirement of a Security Council determination of an act
of aggression would affect ... the application of complementarity").
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revisited" once a definition of aggression and conditions for the ICC's exercise
of jurisdiction were agreed upon.6 8
B. The 2olo Kampala Review Conference
Against this backdrop of repeated failures to engage with
complementarity's application to aggression, the United States increased its
involvement with the ASP as the 2olo Kampala Review Conference
approached. The United States had not participated in the negotiations around
the crime of aggression during the Bush Administration, but the Obama
Administration worked to reengage with the ICC.6' As part of this effort, the
United States identified several issues it thought important to tackle before
Kampala, including complementarity. In March 2oo, U.S. State Department
Legal Adviser Harold Koh addressed the topic in his statement at the Resumed
Eighth Session of the ASP in New York. Koh posed a series of questions about
the mechanics and political viability of situating the crime of aggression within
the complementarity framework, suggesting that domestic aggression
prosecutions might undermine "state cooperation with the [ICC]" and the
ICC's acceptance in the international community. 7o
Despite the United States' increased involvement, the Kampala Review
Conference continued the long trend of acknowledging the difficulties that
complementarity poses but avoiding any deeper consideration of how to
address those difficulties. That the delegates discussed the issue at all was
68. 2004 Princeton Report, supra note 15, at 433-34. The 2005 Special Working Group reiterated
this conclusion. 2005 Princeton Annotated Agenda, supra note 52, at 448; accord Strapatsas,
supra note 55, at 450 (noting the Special Working Group's mentions of complementarity in
its 2004 and 2005 reports).
6g. E-mail from Beth Van Schaack, Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
Office of Glob. Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep't of State, to author (July 14, 2014, 04:45 EST)
(on file with author).
7o. The key portion of the statement was as follows:
[W]ith respect to complementarity, do we want national courts to pass judgment
on public acts of foreign states that are elements of the crime of aggression?
Would adding at this time a crime that would run against heads of state and
senior leaders enhance or obstruct the prospects for state cooperation with the
Court? And will the States Parties enhance the prospects for universality of the
Court by moving to adopt this politicized crime at a time when there is genuine
disagreement on such issues?
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement Regarding Crime of
Aggression at the Resumed Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the
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largely due to the questions that the United States raised at the ASP meetings.'
The Conference Chair, Christian Wenaweser of Liechtenstein, responded to
those questions in a non-paper that sought to address whether the Kampala
Amendments required-or only encouraged- States Parties to domestically
incorporate and exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
Legal Adviser Koh, speaking on behalf of the U.S. delegation, lauded the
non-paper as "a valuable contribution" and expressed support for using
understandings to minimize the risk of "unjustified domestic prosecutions."'
Koh then rearticulated many of the complementarity-related concerns he had
expressed in New York less than three months earlier. He observed that
domestic aggression prosecutions "would ask the domestic courts of one
country to sit in judgment upon the state acts of other countries in a manner
highly unlikely to promote peace and security." 4
With these concerns in mind, the United States proposed small but
significant changes to the Chair's draft. The non-paper, with the United States'
additions represented with underlines and deletions represented with
strikethroughs, stood as follows:
71. See Claus Kreg et al., Negotiating the Understandings on the Crime of Aggression, in THE
TRAVAUX PRPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra note 15, at 81, 91
("Understandings 4 to 7 did not emanate from discussions in the Special Working Group
but from concerns expressed by the US delegation at the November 2009 and March 2010
ASP meetings.").
72. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Non-Paper by the Chair: Further Elements for a
Solution on the Crime ofAggression, INT'L CRIM. CT. para. 4 (May 25, 2010), http://www.icc
-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/RC2olo/RC-WGCA-2-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/827Z-XYPQJ.
73. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement at the Review
Conference of the International Criminal Court (June 4, 2010), http://www.state.gov
/s/l/releases/remarks/142665.htm [http://perma.cc/63AW-83QB].
74. Id. Many national courts apply the act of state doctrine precisely to prevent one nation's
courts from sitting in judgment on the public acts of another nation. The act of state
doctrine extends back at least as far as 1674. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 416 (1964) (citing Blad v. Bamfield (1674) 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch)). The doctrine was
given clear expression by the U.S. Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, in which Chief
Justice Fuller wrote for a unanimous Court:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed and applied the act of state doctrine, even though Cuba had likely violated
international law. The Court noted that while the doctrine is not constitutionally required, it
is rooted in separation-of-powers concerns. 376 U.S. at 423.
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It is understood that the amendments address the definition of the
crime of aggression and the conditions under which the Court shall
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime for the purpose of this
Statute only. The amendments shall, in accordance with article io of
the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other
than this Statute, and shall not be interpreted as constituting a
statement of the definition of "crime of aggression" or "act of
aggression" under customary international law.
It is understood that tThe amendments shall therefore not be
interpreted as creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic
jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another
State.'
The changes to the first paragraph reflected the disagreement among the
States Parties whether the definitions of "crime of aggression" and "act of
aggression" accurately expressed customary international law.76 The proposed
change was intended to stress that the amendments pertained only to
prosecutions under the Rome Statute.
The second paragraph had been the final sentence of the first and only
paragraph in the Chair's draft. The United States reframed it as a separate
understanding to distinguish more clearly "issues of definition versus
jurisdictional competency" and to emphasize "that ratification or acceptance of
the amendments will not empower or oblige states to incorporate the crime of
aggression into their domestic codes or to launch domestic prosecutions for the
crime."
Over the next two days, Claus Kreg of the German delegation facilitated
bilateral, regional, and open informal consultations on the U.S. draft to assess
whether it could achieve a consensus.79 The United States' proposed changes
"met with little public discussion or resistance, except insofar as the words
75. Compare Review Conference of the Rome Statute, supra note 72, with Van Schaack, supra
note 35, at 159-60 (describing the United States' proposed changes).
76. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 16o (referencing William Lietzau, Deputy Assistant Sec'y,
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'customary international law' were ultimately not included in the final text."so
The final text comprised two Understandings:
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of
the act of aggression and the crime of aggression do so for the purpose
of this Statute only. The amendments shall, in accordance with article
1o of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute.
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as
creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with
respect to an act of aggression committed by another State.
On its face, Understanding 5 appears obvious, since the Rome Statute "is
generally not designed to create rights or obligations of States Parties with
respect to domestic legislation and adjudication.",8' But reading Understanding
5 in light of the United States' articulated concerns reveals what Van Schaack
has called a "subtle preference" against domestic incorporation and
prosecution.8 ' Taken in context, Understanding 5 captures and attempts to
respond to the reticence that some delegations at Kampala felt about domestic
aggression prosecutions.8
C. Post-Kampala Developments
Since the 2010 Review Conference, commentators have encouraged states
to incorporate aggression into their domestic criminal codes.8' Thus far, only
So. Id.
81. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex III.
82. Claus Krefg & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime ofAggression,
8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1179,1216 (2010).
83. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 135.
84. Teresa McHenry, Complementarity Issues, 105 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 157, 158 (2011).
85. For example, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University has
published a handbook on the ratification and implementation of the crime of aggression
that includes reasons and options for incorporating the Kampala Amendments via
domestic legislation. LiECH. INST. ON SELF-DETERMINATION, HANDBOOK: RATIFICATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KAMPALA AMENDMENTS TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC
(2013), http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/i/handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/NXX5
-JWHA]. Parliamentarians for Global Action has issued sample legislation that legislatures
might use to incorporate aggression domestically. David Donat Cattin, Campaign for the
Effectiveness and Universality of the Rome Statute System, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOBAL
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six countries -Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
and Samoa 86 -have passed domestic legislation implementing the Kampala
Amendments. But others may soon follow. The Dominican Republic approved
the text, and the law will enter into force after the president enacts it.
Macedonia, New Zealand, Peru, and Venezuela are considering draft criminal
code bills containing the crime of aggression as defined at Kampala.1 South
Africa also appears likely to incorporate.8' The Global Campaign for
Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of
Aggression reports that it expects fifteen other countries to consider
incorporating the crime into domestic law.
Whether a meaningful number of States Parties will actually incorporate
the crime into their domestic law remains unclear. Certainly, there is evidence
of momentum in that direction. Such momentum, fueled by advocacy from
ACTION (2011), http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/4/PGA.Implementingegislation
-drafting-assistance.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7AT-N8FY]. In addition, the International
Center for Transitional Justice held a two-day retreat in October 2010 called
Complementarity after Kampala: The Way Forward. The event brought together more than
sixty representatives from state and nonstate parties, the ICC, development agencies, United
Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, and focused on how best to
strengthen the capacity of states to investigate and prosecute the Rome Statute crimes. One
suggestion that emerged out of the meeting was that the development community should
push donors to place domestic incorporation of the Rome Statute on their agendas.
Meeting Summary of the Retreat on "Complementarity after Kampala: The Way Forward,"
INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2010), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global
-Complementarity-Greentree-2olo-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ16-FLXW].
86. Status of Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of
Aggression, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION KAMPALA
AMENDMENTS ON CRIME AGGRESSION 6 (2015), http://crimeofaggression.info/documents//
/StatusReport-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MVC-83NB].
87. Id.
88. The country's Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development recently made
the following statement at a workshop on the ratification and implementation of the
Kampala Amendments: "South Mrica was one of the first countries to enact legislation
domesticating and implementing the Rome Statute .... We also support the domestication
of the Kampala amendments in line with the Principle of Complementarity." Andries Niel,
Deputy Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., Republic of S. Afr., Statement on the
Occasion of the Workshop on Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Botswana, April 15-16, 2013 (Apr. IS, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov.za/m speeches/2013/20130415-dm-icc.html [http://perma.cc/4EMH
-7JEN].
89. Those countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Costa Rica, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Uruguay. GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION
KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON CRIME AGGRESSION, supra note 86, at 7.
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civil society groups, may only increase after the Amendments come into force
in 2017.
Ill. TENSIONS BETWEEN COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION
The remainder of this Note aims to articulate what remained unsaid at
Kampala. First, I identify the core tensions, problems, and pitfalls associated
with applying the existing complementarity framework to the crime of
aggression. In Section III.A, I analyze the potential risks if states heed the
implied message of Understanding 5 and do not domestically incorporate the
crime of aggression. Conversely, Section III.B explores the problems that
might occur if states do domestically incorporate and prosecute the crime of
aggression. Finally, in Part IV, I identify and analyze various interventions that
could address these problems.
A. Problems ifStates Do Not Incorporate
If States Parties choose not to incorporate the crime of aggression into their
domestic criminal codes, the ICC would be the primary forum for aggression
prosecutions. This approach could produce two notable problems: (i)
incomplete concurrence between proceedings at the domestic level and
proceedings at the ICC; and (2) diminished uptake of an antiaggression norm.
1. Incomplete Concurrence
First, if States Parties do not incorporate the crime, they risk incomplete
concurrence between proceedings at the domestic level and proceedings at the
ICC.9o To understand this problem, imagine a series of events that could give
rise to charges for both the crime of aggression and an atrocity crime, such as
genocide. Most domestic courts, having incorporated the atrocity crimes into
their penal codes but not the crime of aggression, could prosecute only the
atrocity crime and not aggression. Imagine, then, that the domestic court
decided to prosecute the atrocity crime. Because the domestic court would be
unavailable to prosecute for aggression, the ICC could then assert jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, and indict and prosecute for the
crime of aggression.
go. Van Schaack first identified and explicated the problem of incomplete concurrence. This
Section of the Note draws heavily on her work. See Van Schaack, supra note 35.
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To date, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has used a "same person/same
conduct test" to interpret the complementarity principle. In other words, "the
Court will stay its hand if a domestic court is prosecuting the same suspect for
the same impugned conduct, regardless of how the crime is legally
characterized."" As noted above, the atrocity crimes and the crime of
aggression generally proscribe different conduct.92 Because the conduct giving
rise to the domestic court's atrocity prosecution would differ from the conduct
subject to an aggression charge, a prosecution by the ICC for aggression would
be fair game, even though both charges stemmed from the same series of
events.
Yet even if legally permissible, these parallel prosecutions -a domestic
prosecution for an. atrocity crime and an ICC prosecution for aggression -
would put the domestic court and the ICC in difficult situations. First, tough
procedural questions would emerge: Should the domestic and ICC
prosecutions move forward at the same time, or would they need to be
sequenced? If the prosecutions proceed concurrently, which system would have
custody over the defendant? If the ICC ordered the defendant to be transferred
to The Hague, it would effectively divest the domestic court of its jurisdiction
over the alleged perpetrator. How would "overlapping or potentially
contradictory witnesses and evidence" be handled?93 If the prosecutions were
sequenced, which jurisdiction would prosecute first? How would Article 2o's
commitment to ne bis in idem, its double jeopardy provision, apply?94
Second, institutional considerations would have to be weighed. The ICC's
decision to step in and prosecute for aggression could fuel hostility toward the
international tribunal. The prosecution might be understood to undermine the
domestic jurisdiction's sovereignty. It could also discourage the domestic
atrocity prosecution, thus subverting the core purpose of complementarity.
Alternatively, if the ICC chose not to step in and prosecute for aggression, that
decision might undermine its moral role as a bulwark against impunity for
serious international crimes.
In sorting through these complicated questions, the ASP will have to
consider how best to balance the pursuit of the ICC's multiple goals:
encouraging states to exercise their duty to domestically punish serious
international crimes, deterring genuine acts of aggression, ending impunity,
and maintaining positive and productive relationships with States Parties. The
g9. Id. at 134.
92. See supra text accompanying note 13.
g3. McHenry, supra note 84, at 159.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 20.
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answers will bear directly on the ICC's legitimacy and viability as an enduring
tribunal.
2. Diminished Uptake ofan International Antiaggression Norm
By choosing not to incorporate the crime of aggression, States Parties could
stunt the development and broad uptake of an antiaggression norm."
Resource constraints will prevent the ICC from investigating and prosecuting
all acts of aggression.96  Without domestic prosecutions, many acts of
aggression could go unpunished, undercutting the deterrent effect that
originally motivated the ASP to include aggression in the Rome Statute.97 The
Global Campaign for Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression has even argued that failing to
incorporate is antithetical to the principles underlying the Rome Statute.
Indeed, the statute's preamble provides "that it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes."
9s. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 137.
96. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing To Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 280, 285-87 (2012) (noting that the ICC
must selectively prosecute, in part because of its limited resources). That resource
constraints would limit the ICC's scope for action was also one of the primary bases for
adopting the complementarity principle. See Benzing, supra note 19, at 599.
97. Strapatsas, supra note 55, at 473.
98. Why and How To Implement the Amendments, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION
& IMPLEMENTATION KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON CRIME AGGRESSION, (quoting Rome
Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.), http://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/why-and
-how-to-implement-the-amendments [http://perma.cc/8KV2-WSY7].
The Campaign is a joint effort of the Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations
and the Global Institute for the Prevention of Aggression, a civil society organization
established by a former chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. It champions domestic
incorporation as critical to deterring the illegal use of force and bringing violators to
justice. See The Campaign, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION
KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON CRIME AGGRESSION, http://crimeofaggression.info/the
-campaign [http://perma.cc/6HRB-JLBR]; The Global Institute for the Prevention of
Aggression, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION KAMPALA
AMENDMENTS ON CRIME AGGRESSION, http://crineofaggression.info/the-campaign/the
-global-institute-for-the-prevention-of-aggression [http://perma.cc/9MYF-QVMX]; Why
and How To Implement the Amendments, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION &
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B. Problems ifStates Do Incorporate
Notwithstanding the difficulties that may arise, Understanding s
expresses a subtle preference against domestic incorporation of the crime of
aggression. Of course, states need not heed this call. Instead, they may choose
to follow the path of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Luxembourg,
Slovenia, and Samoa, and incorporate the Kampala Amendments into their
domestic penal codes. Countries might incorporate the crime to preserve
sovereign control over aggression prosecutions -particularly of their own
nationals - and preempt the ICC from asserting jurisdiction. They might also
seek to promote an antiaggression norm. But serious practical impediments
may complicate these good intentions. Domestic prosecutions could exacerbate
diplomatic relations and jeopardize international peace and stability.
1. Justiciability, Evidentiary, and Other Jurisprudential Roadblocks to
Prosecutions
Domestic prosecutions for aggression could encounter justiciability,
evidentiary, immunity, and other legal roadblocks. Theresa McHenry, the
Chief of Human Rights and Special Prosecutions at the U.S. Department of
Justice and a member of the U.S. Delegation at Kampala, described several
such roadblocks shortly after the Review Conference concluded. In many
countries, she noted, the crime of aggression will almost certainly implicate
questions within the purview of the political branches, such as "the executive's
commander-in-chief authority or congressional power to declare war.""
Domestic aggression prosecutions might run afoul of various states' political-
question doctrines.'
In addition to justiciability issues, prosecuting states will likely face
evidentiary hurdles. To prove that a state action constitutes aggression, the
prosecution might need to access information that is classified, governed by
executive privilegeo' or state secrets, or otherwise controlled by the putative
aggressor state. States may also have divergent approaches to the burden of
99. McHenry, supra note 84, at 159.
1o. Several countries have a variant of the political question doctrine. See, e.g., Tanada v.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-1o520, 103 Phil. 1051 (S.C., Feb. 28, 1957) (en banc) (discussing the
doctrine in the Philippines); Uganda v. Comm'r of Prisons, Ex parte Matovu (1966) E.A. 514
(Uganda) (presenting for the first time Uganda's political-question doctrine).
101. McHenry, supra note 84, at 159.
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proof on issues such as whether the prosecution must show that an alleged act
of aggression was not self-defense.'o2
Moreover, domestic efforts to prosecute will likely trigger a range of
substantive and procedural immunity arguments, including head-of-state
immunity and foreign official immunity.'o Yet the act of state doctrine - which
provides "that one sovereign should not sit in judgment of another
[sovereign]" -is unlikely to bar a domestic court's prosecution of a
nonnational for aggression.o 4 The doctrine applies only to acts fully executed
within the sovereign's own state. Aggression is, by definition, unlikely to
satisfy that requisite. Furthermore, in the United States, the doctrine has
generally not served as a bar to proceedings for "international crimes or
breaches ofjus cogens."'0
Finally, it is highly unlikely that a victim state could, in practice, exercise
physical custody over the aggressor state's leaders.xo 6 Assuming that a victim
state's aggression prosecution depends on having physical custody of the
aggressors, this fact alone will doom most prosecutions.
Complementarity might not rescue domestic prosecutions from these
practical complications. Should one of these procedural issues impede a
domestic prosecution, the ICC may not necessarily have jurisdiction. Article 17
of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC may assume jurisdiction over a case
where a state with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to prosecute.o7 But
102. Id.
103. Pi Wrange, The Crime of Aggression and Complementarity, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW, supra note to, at 591,
593-94.
104. Id. at 595.
1o. Id. For more on foreign sovereign immunity, see, for example, Arrest Warrant of ii April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14), which held that an
arrest warrant issued against the Democratic Republic of Congo's Minister of Foreign
Affairs failed to respect his immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law.
io6. See Strapatsas, supra note 55, at 473 (noting that, while aggressed states were able to acquire
physical custody over the leaders of the aggressor state for crimes against peace prosecutions
after World War II, "it is uncertain that every act of aggression in the future will always
justify the complete overthrow of the aggressor-state's regime," making the acquisition of
physical custody unlikely in most cases).
107. The "unable or unwilling" standard is also used where State A is attacked by a nonstate
group based in State B and decides that force is required to suppress the threat. State A must
assess whether State B is willing and able to respond. If State B is unable or unwilling to
address the threat, then State A may use force in State B to suppress the threat posed by the
nonstate group. However, as Ashley Deeks has argued in a recent article, "[T]here has been
virtually no discussion, either by states or scholars, of what [the 'unwilling or unable']
standard means." Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
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"inability" and "unwillingness," according to the ICC Chief Prosecutor
Bensouda, do not encompass a situation in which a state attempts to prosecute
but is stymied by legitimate legal roadblocks. Unwillingness, Bensouda states,
"arises if a country lacks the political will to try its own leaders, conducts sham
trials in order to let the guilty go free, allows an unjustifiable delay in bringing
perpetrators to justice, or does not conduct judicial proceedings independently
or impartially.",los Inability "arises, for example, when the judicial system of a
country has collapsed, rendering the state unable to arrest perpetrators or
gather evidence."'' Consequently, if a state initiates an aggression
investigation or prosecution that then fails due to justiciability, evidentiary,
immunity, or other issues, the ICC may not be able to then step in and assume
jurisdiction unless the state self-refers the situation to the ICC. Without a
referral, the aggressor would effectively be immune from prosecution.
2. Threats to International Political Stability, Conflict Resolution, and
Humanitarian Intervention
Procedural and practical hurdles will likely prevent most domestic
aggression prosecutions from reaching a judgment on the merits. Even if
domestic prosecutions could surmount these hurdles, they may undermine
international political stability. Scholars and practitioners agree on this point.
Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, asserts that investigating and prosecuting
the crime of aggression requires a court to examine what "is inherently a
profoundly political decision.""'o Because of the political nature of the crime,
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 486 (2012). To fill this gap, Deeks offers a
set of normative factors to guide the "unwilling or unable" inquiry:
These principles include requirements that the victim state: (i) prioritize consent
or cooperation with the territorial state over unilateral uses of force, (2) ask the
territorial state to address the threat and provide adequate time for the latter to
respond, (3) reasonably assess the territorial state's control and capacity in the
relevant region, (4) reasonably assess the territorial state's proposed means to
suppress the threat, and (5) evaluate its prior interactions with the territorial state.
Id. at 490. Though Deeks does not explicitly extend these factors to the "unwilling or
unable" test as it is used in the Rome Statute, there are clear similarities beyond her analysis
and Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda's articulation of the test. See infra notes 108-109 and
accompanying text. Deeks's factors may therefore help inform the ICC's decision to assume
jurisdiction over a case.
lo8. Bensouda, supra note 28, at 133-34.
109. Id. at 134.
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Van Schaack warns that a domestic aggression charge "will inevitably generate
intense charges of politicization from within and outside the prosecuting
state," "exacerbate relations" between the implicated states, and prompt other
states to "inevitably take sides.""' Similarly, Michael Scharf argues that
aggression prosecutions in domestic courts "may be so politically sensitive that
they cannot be fairly tried and the attempt to do so would undermine efforts at
restoring or maintaining international peace.""' National court indictments -
particularly if employed as a form of "lawfare" to "intimidate and harass
another state or its officials" - might interfere with diplomatic negotiations and
frustrate efforts at conflict resolution." 3
Even the mere specter of an aggression indictment could impede warring
parties from negotiating a peace agreement. The risk increases if a state's
prosecutorial bodies are independent from its diplomats, preventing the
negotiators from ruling out an aggression prosecution." 4 The possibility of
domestic prosecution may also chill a state's willingness to undertake, or
cooperate with, humanitarian intervention to stop the commission of
atrocities."s Nicolaos Strapatsas even speculates that the desire and ability to
domestically prosecute for aggression could motivate an aggressed state to
prolong an armed conflict to ensure the overthrow or removal of the aggressor
state's leader from power." 6 This would make it more feasible to obtain
physical custody over and prosecute the leader."'
ms. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 150; see also Beth Van Schaack, In Advance of Activating the
Crime ofAggression, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2014, 4:21 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org
/13059/advance-activating-crime-aggression [https://perma.cc/MH66-VMAF] (urging
states to codify the crime of aggression in a way that "brings states together under the
umbrella of international justice rather than drives them apart").
112. Scharf, supra note 34, at 381.
113. Id.
114. E-mail from Beth Van Schaack, Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
Office of Glob. Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep't of State, to author (July 14, 2014, 16:45 PST)
(on file with author).
115. Sewall, supra note 9; see also Beth Van Schaack, The ICC Crime ofAggression and the Changing
International Security Landscape, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.: ASIL CABLES (Apr. 16, 2015, 2:43
PM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/icc-crime-aggression-and-changing-international-security
-landscape [http://perma.cc/DRX4-3JJY] (summarizing remarks from Christine Hansen of
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the "desired and undesired chilling effects" of
activating jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, including "the chilling effect that the
[Kampala] amendments may exert on potentially beneficial uses of force").
116. Strapatsas, supra note 55, at 473.
117. Id. Although trials that truly cannot be "conducted independently or impartially" may
render the case admissible under the ICC's jurisdiction, see Rome Statute, supra note 3, art.
17(2)(c), this will not compensate for the damage to peace negotiations and political stability
wrought by a flawed and politicized domestic prosecution attempt. Article 17's "unwilling or
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3. Domestic Alterations to the Definition ofAggression
If states incorporate the crime of aggression, they might deviate from the
carefully calibrated definition of aggression in the Kampala Amendments. The
definition and elements of the crime of aggression, as agreed upon in Kampala,
are products of long and challenging consensus negotiations. States could
jeopardize the legitimacy of the ASP's decision to include the crime under the
Rome Statute-and the legitimacy of the ICC itself-by creating and
prosecuting under a fragmented and incoherent patchwork of aggression
variants.
States might adopt narrower or broader versions of the aggression
amendments, define aggression differently, or ignore the carefully negotiated
protections in the Understandings. For example, a state could fail to
incorporate the crime's leadership requirement. This would expand the range
of potential defendants far beyond the scope contemplated by the ASP. A state
might limit or exclude "the threshold qualifier 'manifest,' which is meant to
prevent the ICC from pursuing cases that are not sufficiently grave or that
involve state conduct whose illegality under the UN Charter framework is
uncertain." ,,A domestic statute might lessen the prosecution's burden of
persuasion from beyond a reasonable doubt. Or a state's statute could permit
"prosecutions for attempted aggression" or could encompass non-state
actors.19
To avoid such situations, the ASP should strongly encourage states that do
incorporate to use the verbatim text of the Kampala Amendments, including
the stipulations contained within the Understandings. 2 o
States face a genuine dilemma with high stakes and strong arguments on
both sides. On balance, however, the subtle preference against incorporation,
as expressed in Understanding 5, is the prudent approach. Incorporation risks
flawed domestic prosecutions that foreclose ICC jurisdiction, international
unable" provisions may also not encompass overzealous prosecutions. See Trahan, supra
note 12, at 583-86.
us. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 152.
11g. Id. The Kampala Amendments contemplate aggression only as defined in terms of state
action.
12o. See id. at 153. The Handbook on the Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments
to the Rome Statute of the ICC, a document put out by civil society champions of the Kampala
Amendments, recommends "verbatim implementation." LIECH. INST. ON SELF-
DETERMINATION, supra note 85, at 15.
760
125:73o 2016
RECONCILING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND COMPLEMENTARITY
political destabilization and disruptions to conflict resolution efforts, and
definitional fragmentation that could permit prosecutions far beyond what the
ASP envisioned and endorsed. In contrast, the problems if states do not
incorporate and prosecute -limited to incomplete concurrence and a slower
antiaggression normative uptake- pose relatively less cause for concern. The
drawbacks to nonincorporation are also more amenable to productive
countermeasures than are the serious potential harms from domestic
incorporation and prosecutions.
IV. A WAY FORWARD
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression agreed nearly a
decade ago that the issues surrounding aggression and complementarity
"merited being revisited once agreement had been reached on the definition of
aggression and the conditions for exercise of the Court's jurisdiction.""
Nonetheless, the uneasy fit between complementarity and the crime of
aggression was inadequately addressed in the lead up to the 201o Kampala
Review Conference. Difficult questions persist, and the ASP must address
them now, before the Kampala Amendments enter into force in 2017. This Part
offers a roadmap for the ASP: it identifies four potential interventions to
resolve the tensions between aggression and complementarity, and suggests
the means by which the States Parties could engage with those interventions.
A. The Substance: Four Possible Interventions
The ASP must seek solutions to the challenges that will result if states do or
do not incorporate and prosecute the crime of aggression. I recommend that
the States Parties consider four possible interventions: (1) establish exclusive
ICC jurisdiction or primacy over the crime of aggression; (2) supplement
Understanding 5 with an official statement from the Chief Prosecutor
discouraging domestic incorporation; (3) encourage prosecutions for ordinary
crimes instead of aggression; and (4) generate a multifactor list to guide
domestic prosecutions.
The first and second interventions limit or discourage domestic
incorporation and prosecution. The third intervention provides an alternative,
less politicized way for states to punish certain acts of aggression. The fourth
intervention seeks to mitigate the harms of domestic aggression prosecutions.
Although the first intervention is the cleanest, its adoption is unlikely. I
therefore recommend that the States Parties focus instead on mobilizing
121. 2004 Princeton Report, supra note i, at 434.
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support for the second, third, and fourth interventions, which are mutually
reinforcing and will work best in concert. I further argue that the States Parties
should devote the greatest attention to the fourth intervention, the most
nuanced and potentially effective intervention of the set.
1. Establish Exclusive ICCJurisdiction or Primacy over the Crime of
Aggression
First, the ASP should consider amending the Rome Statute to establish
exclusive jurisdiction for the ICC over the crime of aggression or, alternatively,
to establish a primacy framework. Neither approach would affect the
jurisdictional regime applied to genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes, which would continue to be situated within a complementarity
framework.
As described in Part II, the ILC contemplated an exclusive jurisdiction
regime for the crime of aggression in its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes."' Under
such a regime, only the ICC could prosecute the crime of aggression. This
approach would be consistent with the principle of par in parem imperium non
habet, as one sovereign state would not sit in judgment of another. A possible
exception to exclusive jurisdiction, also suggested in the 1996 Draft Code of
Crimes, would be to permit a state to try its own nationals for the crime of
aggression.
Primacy is similar to, but not as absolute as, exclusive jurisdiction. Under a
primacy framework, an international tribunal need not defer to domestic
prosecutions; rather, it has the right to trump domestic proceedings." The
ICTY, ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for
122. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
123. For example, Article 9 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) Statute states:
i. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since i
January 1991.
2. The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any
stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request
national courts to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal ....
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNITED
NATIONs art. 9 (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2oLibrary/Statute/statute
septop en.pdf [http://perma.cc/MEQ5-FALD]. The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) Statute contains a parallel provision. Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunalfor Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS art. 8 (Jan. 31, 20io), http://www.unictr.org/sites
/unictr.org/files/legal-library/OO31_Statute en fr o.pdf [http://perma.cc/HCS3-BWN6].
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Lebanon have all adopted a primacy regime." For the ICTY, primacy was
instituted in response to concerns about the "effectiveness and impartiality" of
domestic courts. 2 s For the ICTR, the concern was less that Rwanda's courts
would try to shield perpetrators from justice, and more that they were too
weakened by the genocide to capably prosecute the genocidaires.12 6 The
Security Council established each ad hoc tribunal's primacy regime under its
Chapter VII authority to determine the measures required to "restore
'international peace and security.""2' The ICC, of course, does not enjoy
Chapter VII provenance. It was created via a multilateral treaty, and is intended
to be an enduring, forward-looking institution, rather than responsive to a
specific set of atrocities. As such, its design offers more deference to national
prerogatives."'
Enabling the ICC to assert exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, or giving it the opportunity to trump national prosecutions, would
avoid the political, legal, and procedural problems associated with domestic
aggression prosecutions and described in Section III.B. However, many states
would likely view such power as an illicit incursion on their sovereignty. States
might also perceive these frameworks as disrupting the delicate balance
between preserving national sovereignty and combating impunity for
international crimes. This balance, which complementarity aims to strike, has
been key to the ICC's acceptance and legitimacy in the international
community." Exclusive jurisdiction or primacy might also force the ICC to
choose between two undesirable options: overburdening itself with cases or
declining to pursue most potential prosecutions. Either choice could hinder the
development of a strong antiaggression norm, as discussed in Section III.A.2.
It would also be politically difficult to establish exclusive jurisdiction or
primacy. Doing so would require amending Article 17 of the Rome Statute, as
well as Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter. To amend the Rome Statute, a State
Party must propose the amendment, a majority of those present at the next
meeting of the ASP must vote to consider the proposal, and a two-thirds
124. Trahan, supra note 12, at 573.
125. Id. at 574 (quoting RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMERYUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAw, PoLITICs, AND DIPLOMACY 66 (2004)).
126. Id. at 576-77.
127. Id. at 573 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 39).
128. The limitations of the ad hoc tribunals had also become apparent by the time of the ICC's
creation, and many states likely recognized that greater national participation in atrocity
prosecutions was required to realize the promises of international justice. See E-mail from
Beth Van Schaack to author, supra note 69.
129. See STIGEN, supra note 29, at 252-53.
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majority of States Parties must then vote to adopt it. 30 It took twelve years for
the ASP to agree to the aggression amendments, and there is already
widespread fatigue following Kampala. It is thus unlikely that there will be
much appetite for another amendment in the near future. So, although this
proposal would provide the cleanest solution to the challenges posed by
domestic aggression prosecutions, it is almost certainly politically infeasible.
2. Supplement Understanding 5 with a Diplomatic Overture from the Chief
Prosecutor To Discourage Domestic Incorporation
A softer, more feasible approach to discouraging domestic incorporation
would be to petition ICC Chief Prosecutor Bensouda to make a diplomatic
overture toward States Parties. Bensouda could urge States Parties to give more
space to the ICC to take the lead on aggression prosecutions and generally
refrain from bringing such prosecutions domestically. In so doing, she could
promote the notion that a state can respect its international obligations
regarding serious crimes like aggression by not acting when ICC prosecution
would be more appropriate and effective."'
This approach shares the same goal as the first proposal -limiting domestic
incorporation and prosecution -but does not require the ASP to surmount any
procedural hurdles or formally reconfigure the sovereignty-impunity balance
that complementarity aims to strike.
That strength, however, is also a weakness. A diplomatic overture from the
chief prosecutor is merely that - an overture. Whether a State Party pays it any
heed will depend on how much respect the state has for the chief prosecutor,
how much faith the state has in the ICC's ability to prosecute the crime of
aggression, and how important it is to the state-for symbolic, dignitary,
political, or other reasons-to conduct its own prosecution. A diplomatic
overture is an important part of the shifting norms and expectations on how
the crime of aggression is best prosecuted, but is not a sufficient solution in
itself. States Parties should concurrently pursue the third and fourth
proposals.'
Before discussing those proposals, however, it is important to acknowledge
the major drawback to my first and second proposals. If the ASP adopts a
130. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 121(1)-(3).
131. See William A. Schabas, 'Complementarity in Practice': Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19
CluM. L.F. 5, 6 (2008) (discussing models of complementarity as a constructive or
antagonistic relationship between international and domestic justice).
132. See infra Sections IV.A.3, IV.A.4.
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system of ICC exclusive jurisdiction or primacy," or if States Parties heed the
chief prosecutor's recommendation not to domestically incorporate the crime
of aggression, the ICC may have to contend with the problems of incomplete
concurrence between ICC and domestic prosecutions.
Van Schaack has given this potential problem significant attention and
offers one possible solution: before the aggression amendments enter into
force in 2017, the Chief Prosecutor should "announce . . . the intention to
stay . .. her hand in the event that genuine domestic prosecutions are going
forward on the basis of charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes, even if domestic aggression charges are not available, are legally barred,
or are not forthcoming."'34 The sole exception would arise in cases "in which
the crime of aggression is the primary or central charge to arise out of a
particular situation such that atrocity crimes are non-existent or largely
peripheral.""s
Van Schaack's proposal would allow the ICC to maintain "de facto
exclusivity over the crime of aggression," thus obviating some of the problems
associated with domestic incorporation and prosecution.1, 6 Yet it would also
empower national courts "to take the lead on prosecuting atrocity crimes" and
therefore avoid encumbering the ICC with a massive caseload. 3 7 This is a
smart and practical approach to promoting antiatrocity norms, encouraging
states to fulfill their duty to prosecute international crimes, combating
impunity, and conserving the ICC's limited resources. It avoids the practical
coordination challenges of concurrently prosecuting the same individual for
different crimes arising out of the same events. Furthermore, it establishes a
default position of avoiding politically volatile aggression prosecutions while
leaving space for the ICC to intervene where aggression truly warrants
prosecution.'
3. Prosecute for Violations of Ordinary Criminal Law, Not the Rome Statute
The ASP can further guard against worrisome domestic prosecutions by
encouraging national courts to prosecute an aggressor under ordinary criminal
law. Though the defendant's conduct could trigger an aggression indictment,
the state would apply its ordinary domestic criminal code instead. This would
133. See supra Section IV.A.1.
134. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 133.
135. Id. at 136.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 136-37.
765
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
avoid the par in parem imperium non habet problem of states judging the
conduct of other states. Ordinary criminal prosecutions would not require a
finding that a state had committed an act of aggression, and would instead
target individual acts. 9
But, ordinary criminal law prosecutions will not always be possible.
Whether a domestic analogue to aggression exists will require a case-by-case
determination. For example, cross-border terrorism or using weapons of mass
destruction would constitute aggression under the Kampala Amendments, and
would violate U.S. law.1 4o Yet these examples are rare. Because Article 8 bis
includes a leadership element and requires that an act of aggression have the
"character, gravity and scale" to constitute "a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations," the likelihood that a domestic analogue to the crime of
aggression will be available is slim."
Assuming that a state could find an analogous ordinary crime, the benefit
to this approach is clear. The state could convict and punish the perpetrators
for their harmful actions. In turn, the state would avoid charges of
politicization and threats to political stability and conflict resolution that would
flow from an aggression prosecution."' Because of the Rome Statute's double-
jeopardy provision, prosecuting a defendant for ordinary crimes instead of
aggression in a national court would preclude a subsequent aggression
prosecution by the ICC.' This approach therefore captures the very values
that motivated the adoption of the complementarity framework: respecting
139. E-mail from Beth Van Schaack to author, supra note 69.
14o. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (2012) (providing for the prosecution of U.S. nationals who use a
weapon of mass destruction outside the United States); id. § 23 32b (applying to acts of
international terrorism committed against any person or property within the United States).
141. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex 1.2, art. 8(1) bis.
142. See supra Section II.B.2.
143. Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute provides that "[n]o person who has been tried by another
court for conduct also proscribed under articles 6, 7, 8 or 8 bis shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct." Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annex 1.7. The
emphasis on conduct means that, irrespective of how the crime is named or characterized,
the ICC will not step in if the domestic court is prosecuting the same person for the same
conduct as would constitute aggression under Article 8 bis. See Van Schaack, supra note 35, at
155-57. The ICC's double-jeopardy provisions provide more protection than is available in
the United States under Blockburger v. United States, which forecloses prosecutions only
where two crimes share the same elements. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). That is, double
jeopardy does not apply if each provision violated "requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not." Id. Under Article 17(1) (c) of the Rome Statute, double jeopardy bars a
subsequent prosecution where "[t]he person concerned has already been tried for conduct
which is the subject of the complaint." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(1)(c).
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state sovereignty and ensuring that serious international crimes not go
unpunished.
The drawback of this approach is that prosecuting an act of aggression as
an ordinary crime instead of as a crime of aggression will carry less expressive
value.1" As a result, prosecuting ordinary crimes may do less to contribute to
the spread of an antiaggression norm."' This limitation, however, is
outweighed by the benefit of avoiding the potentially destabilizing
ramifications of a domestic aggression prosecution.
4. Generate a Mult ifactor List To Guide Domestic Prosecutions
Realistically, a diplomatic overture from the ICC Chief Prosecutor will not
deter all States Parties from domestically incorporating the crime of aggression.
Moreover, ordinary criminal-law prosecutions in lieu of aggression
prosecutions will not always be feasible or desirable. At least some States
Parties will proceed with domestic incorporation, particularly after the
Kampala Amendments come into force in 2017. The ASP should therefore
focus primarily on developing guidance to help domestic jurisdictions decide
whether and when to indict and prosecute for aggression.
In particular, the ASP should create a multifactor list to target and prevent
the riskiest domestic prosecutions. Its audience should be domestic decision
makers who choose when to investigate, indict, and try criminal cases, such as
Ministries of Justice and high-level public prosecutors. The ASP should aim to
reach those prosecutors who are especially likely to pursue, or have a
demonstrated history of pursuing, politically sensitive cases with little regard
for the repercussions. These bellicose prosecutors, however, are also most likely
to ignore the need for caution. Accordingly, the ASP should model the tone of
the list on Understanding 5 and its "subtle preference" against domestic
incorporation and prosecution. 46 The ASP should tactfully but clearly convey
that the international community will disfavor prosecutions undertaken with
relative insensitivity to political reverberations -particularly those prosecutions
that might undermine conflict resolution efforts in response to mass atrocities
144. See Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85, 131
(2012); Dawn Sedman, Should the Prosecution of Ordinary Crimes in Domestic jurisdictions
Satisfy the Complementarity Principle?, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUsTICE, supra note 55, at 259, 265 (questioning whether an ordinary criminal law
prosecution will be able "to represent adequately ... the context and nature of the crime").
145. See supra Section III.A.2.
146. Van Schaack, supra note 35, at 135.
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and human rights violations - and that prosecutors who undertake such
actions risk reputational harm.
The list would not bind the States Parties, as it would not formally amend
the Rome Statute. The ASP, however, could champion the list via diplomatic
outreach and strongly recommend it as a tool to Ministries of Justice and
public prosecutors' offices. To enhance the list's credibility, States Parties
should publicly announce their commitment to it. Through widespread
expressions of support and consistent application, the list could gradually
become part of customary international law. G. John Ikenberry wrote of the
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction that "[a]t the very least," the list
would serve as "a gold standard" and make egregious conduct "harder to get
away with.""
The first factor on the list should be whether the United Nations Security
Council has determined that a state committed an act of aggression." 8 The
factor should be understood as dispositive- a threshold precondition for a
domestic aggression prosecution. Determining whether an act of aggression
has occurred "is one of the Council's core Charter functions,"4' and relying on
a United Nations Security Council determination will lend greater legitimacy
to the state's indictment. A Security Council determination would also relieve
the prosecuting state from a highly politicized assessment of whether the
putative aggressor state in fact committed an act of aggression. For these same
reasons, a Security Council determination was central to the ILC's approach in
its draft statute for an international criminal court.so
147. G. John Ikenberry, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2002, at 207 (reviewing PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001)), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews
/capsule-review/2002-oi-o1/princeton-principles-universal-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc
/VDH2-D4TX].
148. See Van Schaack, supra note iii (recommending that domestic legislators consider "limiting
prosecutions to those situations in which the Security Council has declared the commission
of an act of aggression," but not arguing that a Security Council determination should be
dispositive); see also Koh & Buchwald, supra note 9, at 262-63 (discussing the benefits of
entrusting the United Nations Security Council with the responsibility of determining when
a state commits an act of aggression).
149. Van Schaack, supra note 115 (summarizing the remarks of Mort Halperin, senior advisor to
the Open Society Foundations).
iso. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at
44 (1994) ("Any criminal responsibility of an individual for an act or crime of aggression
necessarily presupposes that a State had been held to have committed aggression, and such a
finding would be for the Security Council acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the
Charter ... to make." (emphasis added)); D. Stephen Mathias, Remarks, The Definition of
Aggression and the ICC, 96 PRoc. ANN. MEETING AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 181, 182 (2002) (noting
that Article 23, paragraph 2, of the draft ILC statute provided that the ICC could not exercise
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In addition to the first, dispositive factor, the list should contain several
discretionary factors, including: (1) whether the state(s) with territorial-based
or national-based jurisdiction are unable or unwilling to prosecute (for cases in
which the prosecuting state seeks to exercise nonterritorial jurisdiction); (2)
whether the prosecution is against a country's own nationals;' and (3)
whether prosecutions for ordinary crimes are infeasible.s2
Of the four proposals, the multifactor list to guide domestic action has the
most nuance and the greatest potential for impact. The list responds to the
problems identified in both Sections III.A and III.B. It does not seek to
foreclose all domestic prosecutions and vest exclusive or primary jurisdiction in
the ICC, and thus does not raise the risk of incomplete concurrence or impede
the uptake of an international antiaggression norm.s3 The list instead
recognizes that many states likely will incorporate the crime of aggression into
their domestic penal codes and guides those states to refrain from launching
prosecutions that could jeopardize political stability and conflict resolution
efforts.1s 4 The multifactor list is the most promising of the four proposals, but
is not exclusive of the second and third proposals. Rather, the three proposals
are mutually reinforcing and should therefore be pursued simultaneously.
B. The Form: An Intersessional Gathering
It would be unwise for the United States to wait until the 2017 Review
Conference to raise these issues with sympathetic partners. There is too much
fatigue regarding the crime of aggression, coupled with a sense of fait accompli
jurisdiction "unless the Security Council has first determined that a State has committed the
act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint" (quoting Int'l Law Comm'n, supra,
at 84)).
151. In addition to raising this point in the multifactor list, states might be encouraged to
adopt domestic legislation limiting jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to charges
brought against their own nationals. An example of such a bill was defeated in New Zealand
before the Kampala Review Conference. International Non-Aggression and Lawful Use
of Force Bill 2009 (62-1), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/member/2oo9/oo62/latest
/DLM2252903.html [http://perma.cc/86SD-WLKL].
152. The list of factors might be packaged in a document much like The Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction. The Princeton Principles, formulated through several working group
meetings, aim to "clarify what universal jurisdiction is, and how its reasonable and
responsible exercise by national courts can promote greater justice for victims of
serious crimes under international law." Stephen Macedo, Preface to PRINCETON PROJECT ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
11-12 (2001), https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUK3
-87K8].
153. See supra Section III.A.
154. See supra Section III.B.2.
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post-Kampala. Some members of the ASP even resist the idea that a 2017
Review Conference is needed at all.'
I therefore recommend that the United States organize a Chatham-House-
style gathering for States Parties to engage in a thoughtful, deliberative process
about the practicalities left unexamined in Kampala.'1 6 The States Parties
would wrestle with the implications of situating the crime of aggression inside
a complementarity framework and aim to generate a set of best practices. A
best practice guide, in turn, could influence concrete action at a 2017 Review
Conference or, at a minimum, guide States Parties in their decisions about
incorporation and subsequent prosecutions.s7
If the effort to convene a pre-2017 intersessional gathering should fail,
interested States Parties could instead focus on the final decision that the ASP
must take to activate the Kampala Amendments. Article 15(3) bis states, "The
Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance
with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the
155. Telephone Interview with Beth Van Schaack, supra note 42.
156. Id. As a nonparty to the Rome Statute, however, the United States must lead from behind.
The United States should reach out to other concerned states, focusing on strong ICC
members who share the United States' skepticism of the crime of aggression. Denmark and
Japan are two prime examples. Id.; see also Van Schaack, supra note 115 (summarizing the
remarks of Hansen of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Danish perspective on
ratification).
157. Of course, getting States Parties to attend a deliberative gathering would be challenging.
The conveners might encourage attendance by distributing an issue brief clearly describing
the ill fit between complementarity and aggression and the political crises that could ensue if
there is widespread domestic incorporation and prosecution for the crime of aggression. The
issue brief should invoke recent uses of force that could be classified as "aggression" as
defined by the Kampala Amendments, for which domestic prosecutions could trigger
political instability, jeopardize efforts to restore or maintain peace and security, and threaten
the legitimacy of the ICC. Examples of such uses of force include the Russian Federation's
engagement in the Crimea in spring 2014, the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, and
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The issue brief should emphasize that uncritically
applying a complementarity framework to the crime of aggression is an insufficiently
nuanced approach that may have serious and detrimental impacts. Without the distraction
of the many other issues that dominated the agenda in Kampala, a clear and compelling
issue brief could help create the urgency necessary to inspire delegations to attend the
proposed gathering.
Before any intersessional gathering occurs, though, there must first be an up-to-date
count of the States Parties that have already or intend to ratify the Kampala Amendments
and those that have already or intend to domestically incorporate the crime of aggression.
The Global Campaign for Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on
the Crime of Aggression, a civil society organization, tracks and publishes these data. This
source should be sufficient, but one of the convening states might also call upon its
ambassadors to verify and update the Global Campaign's data before the collective process
begins. Telephone Interview with Beth Van Schaack, supra note 42.
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same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an
amendment to the Statute."" 8 Concerned States Parties could invoke this
requirement to raise (and attempt to resolve) some of the difficult questions
around complementarity and to put a finer point on the subtle preference
against domestic incorporation of the crime of aggression. Still, states should
not wait until this decision juncture to engage States Parties in a dialogue
about possible interventions. If progress is to be made, a longer-term
engagement strategy such as the one proposed here is required. 15 9
In organizing the proposed gathering, the conveners should aim to
replicate the Princeton Process's informal, intersessional meetings. These
meetings generated fruitful, productive discussions, according to Stefan
Barriga, who from 2003 to 2010 served as principal legal advisor to the primary
negotiators on the crime of aggression."o He attributed the success to the
following considerations: a "serene environment" that helped inspire a
"friendly and constructive atmosphere"; discussions structured around
"individual contributions . . . generally understood not to be binding on the
government that nominated the respective participant"; the "active
involvement of NGO representatives" who offered "great expertise . .. thereby
elevating the quality of the exchange"; a "pro-active approach" taken by the
Chairman, as demonstrated by his submission of informal non-papers and use
of questionnaires to shape the agendas; intermeeting communication over an
e-mail list; and a general "sense of camaraderie" that generated "interactive,
focused, open and frank" discussions.
Of course, not everyone agrees with Barriga's view that the Princeton
Process was a resounding success, for it skirted many difficult political issues.
Kreg observed that it "focused on legal and technical questions. . . .
[R]elatively little time was wasted with rehearsing the divergent and well-
entrenched views" on the highly political question of the Security Council's
role. 6 , Instead, Kreg explained, "[M]ost intellectual energy was applied to
reducing the differences of opinions on a host of other issues of a less politically
sensitive nature."',6 Koh noted that the Princeton Process was "unable to
158. Kampala Amendments, supra note 2, annexL.3, art. 15(3) bis.
1s. This idea was suggested by Van Schaack. E-mail from Beth Van Schaack to author, supra
note 69.
16o. Barriga now serves as the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Principality of
Liechtenstein to the United Nations.
161. Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAw AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME
STATUTE TO ITS REvIEw, supra note io, at 621, 624.
162. Kreg & Holtzendorff, supra note 82, at 1188.
163. Id.
771
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
bridge very significant differences of views among states" even though the
participants addressed "at length" the jurisdictional prerequisites for an ICC
prosecution for aggression.164
Ideally, these drawbacks to the Princeton Process will be less salient at the
gathering proposed here, given its singular, explicit focus on the highly
political issues surrounding complementarity. Delegations will attend because
of their interest in and commitment to resolving these tough questions,
creating a rigorous, results-oriented environment.
CONCLUSION
The ASP took twelve years to fulfill the promise it wrote into the Rome
Statute: to set out the conditions under which the ICC would exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. During those twelve years, the
international community repeatedly confessed that a complicated problem
loomed on the horizon, but declined to grapple with its implications. Even at
the 2olo Kampala Review Conference, the ASP failed to meaningfully wrestle
with the tensions between the Rome Statute's complementarity framework and
the crime of aggression.
This Note diagnosed the problems that could arise if states do or do not
incorporate the crime of aggression into their domestic penal codes and charted
an agenda around which the United States and concerned States Parties might
convene. Admittedly, there is strong inertia against reviving this unfinished
conversation post-Kampala. But it would be a shame if States Parties allow that
inertia to undermine the global community's hard-fought effort to define,
punish, and deter a serious international crime. Without action to resolve the
complementarity question, the aggression amendments could give way to
highly politicized or badly managed prosecutions that endanger conflict
resolution prospects; flawed domestic prosecutions that bar subsequent ICC
intervention; or an incoherent patchwork of domestic aggression variants. In
short, the amendments could give rise to prosecutions that endanger, rather
than promote, peace and justice. In turn, these risks threaten to undermine the
ICC itself and the United States' relationship with it, both of which are fragile.
Though these issues may not yet feel urgent, they must be addressed before
policymakers' neglect manifests in an acute crisis. Once ratified, the aggression
amendments and their concomitant norms will be much harder to change. The
United States and other concerned states must enlist States Parties to address
these questions and devise an approach before 2017 arrives.
164. Koh, supra note 73.
772
125:73 o 2016
